Officer Experience and Training Aren't Enough: Oregon Court Throws Out Solicitation Arrest in State v. Merryman
Charged With Attempted Solicitation in Portland? A New Court Ruling Could Help Your Case
On a chilly September evening around 7:45 p.m., Detective Larsen of the Portland Police Bureau's human trafficking unit was parked near Northeast Sandy Boulevard, an area police associate with prostitution. He watched a woman in a skirt, a small jean jacket, and heels stand at an intersection for about seven minutes, looking at her phone and at traffic. A black car pulled up across the street and sat for a minute or two, drove off, then circled back about two minutes later. The car turned into a tavern driveway, and the woman walked in behind it and got into the passenger seat. The driver crossed the street to a mini market parking lot, and 10 to 15 seconds later she got out and walked toward the store.
That was all. The detective saw no eye contact and no signal between them. But he had worked in human trafficking since 2019, with at least 300 hours of training and at least 400 investigations, and he called it probable cause. Officers stopped the driver, Michael Merryman, and arrested him for attempted commercial sexual solicitation. When they found a handgun in his car, they added a firearm charge.
On September 23, 2026, the Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that the detective's training and experience weren't enough. In State v. Merryman, 353 Or App 101 (2026), the court held that police lacked probable cause to arrest Merryman, so the evidence should have been suppressed. It reversed his convictions and sent the case back to the trial court.
What Police Need Before They Can Arrest You for Solicitation
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution protects against "unreasonable search, or seizure." Under ORS 133.310(1), an officer can arrest you without a warrant only if the officer has probable cause to believe you committed a crime.
Probable cause requires "a substantial objective basis for believing that more likely than not an offense has been committed and a person to be arrested has committed it." ORS 131.005(11). Under State v. Owens, 302 Or 196 (1986), that standard has two parts:
Subjective: The officer subjectively believes that a crime has been committed (i.e., the officer actually thinks you committed a crime).
Objective: That belief is objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances (i.e., a reasonable person looking at all the same facts would reach the same conclusion).
A person commits commercial sexual solicitation under ORS 167.008 if the person "pays, or offers or agrees to pay, a fee to engage in sexual conduct or sexual contact." Merryman was arrested for attempting that crime. Police also cited Portland's unlawful prostitution procurement activity ordinance, which covers any conduct that "constitutes a substantial step in furtherance of an act of prostitution."
The opinion turned on the objective prong. As the court framed it, the question was whether the detective "had a substantial objective basis for believing that, more likely than not, defendant had engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step in furtherance of an act of prostitution" (i.e., based on everything the detective saw, was it more likely than not that Merryman was trying to pay for sex?).
Courts look at the "totality of the circumstances," and an officer's training and experience are part of that picture. But Oregon courts have held that experience cannot be the entire basis for probable cause. An officer doesn't have to rule out every innocent explanation. But the illegal explanation has to be more likely than not, and a hunch dressed up as expertise doesn't meet that bar.
What the Court Decided and Why
The trial court denied Merryman's motion to suppress. It found that no single fact was enough on its own, but that "considering everything altogether," Detective Larsen had probable cause to arrest him. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the circumstances did not give Larsen an objectively reasonable basis to believe that, more likely than not, Merryman had committed attempted commercial sexual solicitation.
Larsen's belief that the woman was a sex worker was not objectively reasonable. The court looked at each fact police relied on:
The location. Standing in an area known for prostitution is not suspicious in itself.
Her clothing. The court said her outfit of a skirt, jean jacket, and heels "adds little." The court called the judgment of whether an outfit suits the weather "largely subjective." It also noted the outfit didn't match Larsen's own testimony that sex workers often wear "skimpy attire."
Her behavior. Looking at a phone, watching traffic, and having no obvious destination were not so "remarkable" as to suggest she was a sex worker. Larsen didn't recognize her as a known sex worker.
The court also weighed what Larsen didn't see. By his own account, sex workers often walk slowly or "seductively," stay near the hotel where they work or in dimly lit areas, and try to make eye contact with drivers. None of that happened here.
Merryman's driving didn't fill the gap. The court agreed that stopping at the intersection, circling back, and parking nearby where the woman got in "may be consistent" with illegal sex work. But there may also be a lawful explanation. Without more, such as the woman being a known sex worker, any conclusion about Merryman's reasons would be "speculative."
Larsen's own training cut against the arrest. He testified that buyers and sex workers usually signal their intentions to each other before she gets in, then drive off to work out the details. He saw no such signal. Instead, Merryman drove across the street, and the woman got out after 10 to 15 seconds and walked toward a mini market. That didn't match the sequence of events Larsen described.
The court called it a close case. It acknowledged that the circumstances may have looked suspicious and "warranted further observation." But suspicion is not probable cause. The facts did not establish an objectively reasonable belief that, more likely than not, Merryman had committed attempted commercial sexual solicitation. The trial court therefore erred in denying the motion to suppress.
What This Means If You've Been Charged
Merryman is a reminder that an arrest is only as strong as the facts behind it. If police arrest you without probable cause, evidence gathered as a result of that arrest can be suppressed (i.e., the prosecution can't use it against you). Merryman moved to suppress all of the evidence from his arrest, which included the handgun officers found in his car.
The decision offers several lessons for anyone facing a solicitation charge in Portland:
"Training and experience" is not a blank check. Courts will consider an officer's expertise, but it cannot replace actual, observed facts pointing to a crime.
Innocent conduct doesn't become criminal because of where it happens. Being in an area police associate with prostitution, stopping your car, or giving someone a short ride is not enough on its own.
What the officer didn't see matters. Courts compare what an officer says usually happens with what actually happened. Here, the detective's own testimony about typical buyer and sex-worker behavior helped undermine the arrest.
The details of the stop are critical. How long someone waited, whether there was eye contact, and what happened after someone got into the car can decide whether an arrest holds up.
Every case turns on its own facts, and the court itself called this one close. But Merryman makes clear that suspicion and an officer's training and experience, standing alone, are not enough to justify an arrest.
Talk to a Defense Attorney About Your Case
If you've been arrested for attempted commercial sexual solicitation or a related charge in Portland, the facts police relied on matter. A careful review of the police report, the officer's observations, and the timeline of the stop can reveal whether the arrest was supported by probable cause. If it wasn't, a motion to suppress may be one of the strongest tools in your defense.
At our firm, we examine every detail of how and why you were arrested. Give us a call at 503-453-4273, and we can discuss your case in a free consultation.
This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. The outcome of any case depends on its specific facts.